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Snakes and Ladders: State Interventions and the 
Place of Liberty in Public Health Policy 
Dawson A., 2016 
 
 
The children’s game ‘snakes & Ladders’ is a race across a board of one hundred 
squares as each player takes turns to shake the dice. Progress is, generally, 
determined by cumulative high scores. However, if you land on a square with a 
ladder on it, you move further up the board. If you land on a snake, you move down. 
Rather like life itself, snakes and ladders is a game of chance, with unearned benefits 
and hazards impacting upon your success. However, not all ladders are, apparently, 
good things. In this paper I outline and explore some problems in the way that the 
Nuffield Council of Bioethics’ report Public Health: Ethical Issues presents its 
‘Intervention Ladder’. They see the metaphor of a ladder both as capturing key 
normative priorities and as making a real and important contribution to ethical 
policymaking in public health. In this paper I argue that the intervention ladder is not 
a useful model for thinking about policy decisions, that it is likely to produce poor 
decisions, and that it is incompatible with the report’s stated approach to relevant 
public health policy values. 
 
1. What is the Intervention Ladder? 
 
The Nuffield Council of Bioethics (NCB) report presents a modified form of liberalism 
in which individual liberty to decide and act is given a central role, but it is not the 
only important thing, nor is it always the most important thing.[1] Appeal is made to 
a particular interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s political views as a justification for 
the important role for liberty, but it is made clear that other considerations will also 
be significant within their ‘framework’, such as distributive issues, effectiveness, a 
precautionary approach and something that they call proportionality. It is unclear 
exactly how these different elements are supposed to be combined, but presumably 
they are to be weighted differently in response to different policy issues and cases. 
Ultimately, the NCB appeal to the metaphor of stewardship to point to the 
obligations of government to act to create the conditions for individuals to make 
their free choices and provide basic assistance to those unable to look after their 
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own interests.1 I think that such a position can be characterised as a pluralistic form 
of liberalism, in the sense that it suggests that more than one thing is valuable. For 
the purposes of the argument in this paper, I will assume such an approach is 
correct.2 However, as part of their framework, the NCB propose the intervention 
ladder ‘[t]o assist in thinking about the acceptability and justification of different 
policy initiatives to improve public health’ (p.41). So what is ‘The Intervention 
Ladder’? It is presented in the following way: 
 
  
 
 
 
 Eliminate Choice. Regulate in such a way as to entirely eliminate choice, for 
example through compulsory isolation of patients with infectious diseases. 
 
 Restrict choice. Regulate in such a way as to restrict the options available to people 
with the aim of protecting them, for example removing unhealthy ingredients from 
foods, or unhealthy foods from shops or restaurants. 
 
 Guide choice through disincentives. Fiscal and other disincentives can be put in 
place to influence people not to pursue certain activities, for example through 
taxes on cigarettes, or by discouraging the use of cars in inner cities through 
charging schemes or limitations on parking spaces. 
 
 Guide choices through incentives. Regulations can be offered that guide choices by 
fiscal and other incentives, for example offering tax-breaks for the purchase of 
bicycles that are used as a means of travelling to work. 
 
 Guide choices through changing the default policy. For example, in a restaurant, 
instead of providing chips as a standard side dish (with healthier options available), 
menus could be changed to provide a more healthy option as standard (with chips 
as an option available). 
 
 Enable choice. Enable individuals to change their behaviours, for example by 
offering participation in an NHS ‘stop smoking’ programme, building cycle lanes, or 
providing free fruit in schools. 
 
 Provide information. Inform and educate the public, for example as part of 
campaigns to encourage people to walk or eat five portions of fruit and vegetables 
per day. 
 
 Do nothing or simply monitor the current situation.  
  
 
 
 
The Intervention Ladder (1, p.42) 
                                                        
1
 The stewardship metaphor has also been subject to criticism.[2-4] 
2
 I find a pluralistic approach to values attractive, whether justified within the broad bands of some 
form of liberalism or through other means. Justification of such an approach I leave to another 
occasion. 
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The NCB clearly intend the intervention ladder to be used in policy making as a 
practical means to justify policy outcomes. It is also apparent that there is a clear set 
of normative commitments that are made explicit in the figure, roughly, the idea 
that interventions should be restrictive of individual choices to the least possible 
degree.3 In the next sections I outline three issues for the supporter of the 
intervention ladder. The first outlines a dilemma, forced by a lack of coherence 
between the intervention ladder and the apparent pluralism as outlined and 
defended by the NCB. The second is that the detail of the metaphor of an 
intervention ladder makes no sense, particularly in relation to the placing of the 
‘rungs’. The third problem is that the most natural reading of the metaphor suggests 
a commitment to the idea of the least restrictive alternative, and this is problematic 
both in its own terms, but also as part of a pluralistic liberalism that the NCB 
apparently wish to defend. 
 
2. The Intervention Ladder as Metaphor: Coherence and Use 
 
In this section I suggest that the metaphor of a ladder is both unclear and unhelpful 
and, even worse, is strictly incoherent when viewed in the context of the NCB’s 
apparent pluralistic liberalism.  
 
How should we understand the metaphor of the ladder? The key relevant idea is 
surely a spatial one. A ladder is, for all intents and purposes in this context, a two-
dimensional object. Generally speaking, when using ladders, we start at the bottom 
and climb up. This is true if we are painting a house or playing snakes and ladders. 
However, although in snakes and ladders we move straight to the top of the ladder, 
we are not encouraged to do so on the intervention ladder. Indeed, precisely the 
opposite is suggested in a natural normative reading of the idea of ascending rungs. 
Once we have the two dimensions of the ladder in mind, we can ask what it is that 
allows us to see where we ought to be on the ladder, and the most plausible reading 
of the metaphor is that we should be as low as possible because that gives the 
greatest liberty to individuals to act for themselves. For example, the NCB suggest 
this when they say: 
 
Quote 1: ‘The first and least-intrusive step on the ladder is to do 
nothing, or at most monitor the situation. The most intrusive is to 
legislate in such a way as to restrict freedoms significantly, either 
for some groups of the population or the population as a whole, in 
order to achieve gains in population health. The higher the rung on 
the ladder at which the policy maker intervenes, the stronger the 
justification has to be’ (pp.41-2 – my italics) 
 
and  
 
                                                        
3
 It is interesting to note in passing that this central metaphor has indeed been taken up by policy 
makers, and it received a ringing endorsement and a central place in justifying the UK coalition 
government’s laissez-faire approach to public health.[5] 
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Quote 2: ‘The range of options available to government and policy 
makers can be thought of as a ladder of interventions, with 
progressive steps from individual freedom and responsibility 
towards state intervention as one moves up the ladder’ (p.42 – my 
italics). 
 
Both of these quotes suggest movement from bottom to top as graded and 
progressive with each step entailing a necessary concomitant restriction of freedom. 
Presumably such restriction is seen to be a bad thing, as it apparently requires 
‘stronger justification’. In other places in the text, however, it seems as though there 
is more at stake than just liberty, so other considerations are also mentioned. For 
example, quote 1 is followed immediately by: 
 
Quote 3: ‘A more intrusive policy initiative is likely to be publicly 
acceptable only if it is clear that it will produce the desired effect and 
that this can be weighed against the loss of liberty that will result’ 
(p.42 – my italics). 
 
And quote 2 is followed by: 
 
Quote 4: ‘In considering which ‘rung’ is appropriate for a particular 
public health goal, the benefits to individuals and society should be 
weighed against the erosion of individual freedom. Economic costs 
and benefits would need to be taken into account alongside health 
and societal benefits’ (p.42 – my italics). 
 
The first two quotes suggest that we should hold liberty as the key value and move 
up from the bottom of the ladder to the top (at our peril). The second two quotes, 
more compatible with the NCB’s pluralism, suggest that liberty is only one of the 
many relevant considerations to take into account in policy making. I don’t see how 
quotes 1 and 2 can be made compatible with quotes 3 and 4, and I think these 
tensions are symptomatic of a fundamental incoherence in the role of the 
intervention ladder within the NCB’s broader policy approach. I suggest that we can 
restore coherence in two ways. One is to embrace the value pluralism that the NCB 
officially supports, but this entails rejecting the intervention ladder as a useful policy 
tool. The alternative is to embrace the intervention ladder, accept a focus on a single 
scalar value, namely liberty, and a commitment to have the least restrictive 
alternative possible, but this entails rejecting the NCB’s pluralism. This dilemma is 
central to my discussion in this paper. 
 
3. Rungs on the Ladder. Will the Ladder Function? 
 
Let’s assume, for now, that the role of the intervention ladder in policy deliberation 
is coherent and clear. In this section I argue that even in its own terms the ladder, 
conceived of as a series of rungs of types of intervention, arranged in the suggested 
order, does not work. One thing that seems really important to a ladder is that one 
rung is firmly fixed above the previous ones, allowing a seamless and accident-free 
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ascent. However, a major problem with the intervention ladder is that this is not the 
case. Let’s consider the different rungs and where they are placed. 
 
The first rung is ‘do nothing or simply monitor the situation’. However, a problem is 
immediately obvious in that these two elements are not the same.4 Monitoring a 
situation may require substantive public health activity such as surveillance work, 
seeking to remain vigilant for disease outbreaks or changes in a population’s health. 
This is very different from ‘doing nothing’. So perhaps we need to attach another 
rung at the bottom of the ladder, or perhaps ‘doing nothing’ is the ground on which 
the ladder stands?  
 
It is not clear how the second (‘provide information’) and the third (‘enable choice’) 
rungs can be clearly separated, as information will often be a key aspect of enabling 
a choice. The second rung is a possible but not necessary means to the third. 
Normal, safe ascent of a ladder would entail necessarily moving from the second to a 
third rung. In addition, I find it difficult to understand why the provision of a cycling 
lane (one of the examples the NCB use of a third rung intervention) is considered to 
be more ‘restrictive’ than the provision of information (rung 2). It may be more 
costly (in terms of expense) and involve opportunity costs, but this has no direct 
impact on liberty. In fact, the provision of a cycling lane, where there was not one 
previously, may be considered to be providing a new opportunity for autonomous 
choice where one did not exist before.5 
 
It is equally hard to see how rungs four, five and six can be ordered in the way 
suggested or kept apart, as providing incentives (fifth) or disincentives (six) may be 
ways to change a default policy (four).6 Indeed, providing information (two) seems 
like another way to change a default. So it is unclear how these ‘rungs’ are to be 
ordered at all. Is it obvious that disincentives are more problematic (as they are 
higher) than incentives? Why should we think that taxing tobacco (a disincentive) is 
more problematic than paying people to quit tobacco use (an incentive)? If it is the 
idea of an ‘interference’ that is supposed to be wrong, it is presumably wrong 
because it pushes or coerces in a particular direction. It is hard to see why the 
positive or negative nature of the means contributes to its wrongness (at least in the 
liberty-restricting respect).7  
                                                        
4
 Rather bizarrely the NCB say something like this themselves (p.42). 
5
 For discussion of how richer accounts of autonomy would complicate any intervention ladder, even 
if we stick with gradations using that single value.[6] 
6
 Presumably, rung 4 (Guide choices through changing the default policy) is held to be lower because 
the NCB seem to presume that so-called ‘nudging’ or libertarian paternalism is less of an 
“interference” than rung 5 and 6 activities. Critics of nudging would, of course, dispute this. I don’t 
have the space to explore this here, but my own view is that the very idea of nudging assumes that 
liberty is the value to be given highest priority, and so the very way the debate is set up assumes a 
contestable ranking of values. 
7
 In fact, I find it hard to understand why we should think of taxation on something such as tobacco as 
strictly interfering with liberty at all. A higher price may be irritating and may mean I have to forgo 
other things I want, but strictly speaking I’m still free to buy tobacco. The exception would be when 
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So we have added a rung, collapsed two together, and suggested it is not clear how 
other rungs are to be held one above another. It’s very hard to see the intervention 
ladder as a useful policy tool after this quick survey. Even if we still have a useful 
ladder, it would seem to be a dangerous one, and using it is surely inadvisable. What, 
I think, this points to is the conclusion that there is no clear metric that can be used 
to rank the rungs or even describe each rung, beyond a vague idea about one thing 
being more ‘restrictive’ than something else. So now we come to the heart of the 
metaphor: what exactly is it that is supposed to justify the normative status of the 
intervention ladder itself? 
 
4. Value Ranking and the Intervention Ladder 
 
It has been suggested to me in conversation that I am taking the linear nature of the 
ladder too seriously and that there is no suggestion that we must move from lower 
rungs to higher rungs. However, I think the natural way to read the metaphor is to 
see it as an ascending ranking of choices with the ‘least restrictive’ at the bottom 
and the most restrictive at the top. This allows actual or tacit appeal to the idea of 
the least restrictive alternative. This also allows us to understand the normative 
commitment behind the ladder rankings: the lesser the restriction, the better the 
policy. The idea of the Least Restrictive Alternative (LRA) had its origins in US 
jurisprudence about mental health. However, it is increasingly common in 
discussions of public health ethics and in public health policy documents.8  There is 
much to say about it, but here I will focus on using the LRA principle as a means of 
interpreting the way that the intervention ladder is supposed to work.9  
 
Again we have a tension between two possible interpretations of LRA and hence a 
lack of clarity in how we are to think about the ordering of the rungs on the ladder. 
To illustrate these alternatives I will turn to the discussion of LRA by two authorities 
in public health ethics and law, Ross Upshur,[7] who outlines a series of principles for 
public health ethics that includes the ‘least restrictive or coercive means’, and Larry 
Gostin,[8] who includes ‘the least restrictive alternative’ in his list of public health 
values that are important for pandemic planning and response.10 
 
Gostin offers a means/ends account of LRA when he says: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
rates of taxation are exorbitant to the point that an average person cannot afford the goods in 
question. 
8
 There are a number of parallel formulations of similar policy ‘principles’, such as invoking not just 
the least restrictive alternative (LRA), but also the least coercive alternative (LCA) and the least 
infringing alternative (LIA). These each require separate discussion, but broadly speaking the same 
objections I frame here in terms of LRA can apply to LCA and LIA. 
9
 For more on related issues, see [9-11]. 
10
 I don’t have space to outline their full views here, but see [10] for discussion of public health 
principlism. 
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‘The standard does not require officials to utilize less-than-optimal 
interventions, but rather to select the least intrusive alternative 
than can best achieve the identified health objective’ (p.368). 
 
On this view, LRA is used in the choice between alternatives once the end (that 
which best achieves the relevant public health goal) is identified. The end can be 
chosen on the basis that it is optimal in terms of promoting health. There are two 
key problems with this approach to LRA. First, if we are to choose the least 
restrictive alternative as a means to a particular end, what’s to stop us just changing 
the end if we decide we want a more restrictive policy? On this view, what counts as 
the relevant end is both crucial and contentious, and it is unclear how we are 
supposed to keep this ‘fixed’. Second, if we ignore the first objection, then this 
interpretation seems to make LRA out to be pretty trivial. Why would anyone aim to 
introduce a more restrictive intervention than was necessary to attain a particular 
end (once we are agreed on that particular end)?  
 
Upshur offers a slightly different two-stage process: 
 
‘This principle recognizes that a variety of means exist to achieve 
public health ends, but that the full force of state authority and 
power should be reserved for exceptional circumstances and that 
more coercive methods should be employed only when less coercive 
methods have failed’ (p.102). 
 
Here, there is a clear order of priorities, in which we start with the least restrictive 
and move on to the next most restrictive intervention only once the lesser restrictive 
measure has failed, and so on. This priorities interpretation clearly has similarities 
with a more substantive interpretation of the intervention ladder, with the role of 
liberty being given such a high ranking in our values that it is the fundamental 
determinant of policy. We only move on to the next step of more 
restriction/coercion once there has been a failure to achieve the policy goal at the 
lesser level. Gostin’s means/ends interpretation suggests a much later and weaker 
role for liberty in policy decision-making, and such a view applied to the NCB 
position may suggest that the intervention ladder is actually not that important, but 
is more of a means of making marginal determinations of what we ought to do once 
our public health goals are set (taking into account all relevant considerations).  
 
Given all the detail of the metaphor of the intervention ladder as outlined above, it 
certainly seems a natural interpretation to accept the stepped priorities view of the 
LRA as central to the ladder, and this certainly seems to be the way that the coalition 
government understand it and implement it.11 They use it to justify their ideological 
commitment to promoting voluntary deals with industry and an informational 
approach to health promotion. The focus on the single value of liberty means that 
there is no engagement with the relevant evidence about what is effective, no 
acknowledgement of how collective values can be protective and promoting for 
                                                        
11
 Of course, the NCB cannot be held liable for the government’s use of their tool, but it should have 
been apparent given the way the intervention ladder is structured, that this would be the result. 
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individuals, and no sense of how the intervention ladder conflicts with their other 
declared policy goals such as a declared concern about health inequities.12  
 
The very idea of the least restrictive alternative encourages the idea that each value 
is separate and we want the most or the least of something. Liberty is good and 
restrictions are bad. We should maximise liberty and minimise restrictions. But 
values don’t work like this. Sometimes, all things considered, less of a value, even 
something that we think is really, really valuable, can be for the best. In addition, a 
fundamental problem with the very idea of the least restrictive alternative, and 
there seems to be a similar issue at the heart of the intervention ladder, is that the 
focus on liberty assumes that we can make judgements about this one value in 
isolation from all others. There is an implicit ceteris paribus clause in the approach. 
We can judge what is more or less restrictive, but we can only do this if all else 
remains equal. However, all else does not remain equal. Expanding or contracting a 
single value, such as liberty, is almost certainly going to interact with and impact on 
other values. This is why we think of ethics as involving trade-offs between values. 
We may need to decide how much liberty we are willing to sacrifice to bring about 
greater equity or greater well-being.13 There may be the occasional case where we 
have agreed the end and we only use LRA to select which means is best, but such 
situations are not going to be common in real world policy making. Policy making is 
messy and difficult and all kinds of trade-offs will be necessary. The NCB’s 
commitment to their pluralistic framework seems to accept this. The intervention 
ladder actually gets in the way of this approach, because it focuses our attention 
only on a single value (liberty) and makes it less likely that other values will be given 
their due.14 
 
As an example, suppose you were worried about rising rates of alcohol use in the 
population. Which policy should you introduce? If you follow the intervention 
ladder, it is natural to start by doing nothing, before slowly thinking about moving up 
the rungs of the ladder (as each successive policy fails). However, any pluralist, 
including the NCB, may reject this and look at the full range of relevant 
considerations and not just look at the impact on liberty. We might have good 
evidence that information provision will make no difference (other interventions 
may be more effective). One option would be to have a disincentive through a higher 
                                                        
12
 To be fair to the government, they seem ultimately committed to the same incoherence as the NCB 
in terms of promoting the intervention ladder and also suggesting they are concerned about health 
inequities. 
13
 A better metaphor than a ladder would be thinking about a sound mixing desk on which each of the 
levers and dials represents different values and can be changed to add more or less for different 
frequencies, tracks or instruments. Moving one of these, adding bass, for example, may mean that 
others need to be changed to create a harmonious sound. 
14
 Of course, such a focus on liberty and the intervention ladder itself, both seem to conceptualise 
public health policy and related ethical issues in a narrow way. Presumably, public health ethics is to 
be seen as a fight between the free individual versus the oppressive state. So much is wrong with this 
idea that it is unclear where to start. But note that as a focus for policy it is hopeless. How do we 
conceptualise our obligations in relate to climate change, population migration, pollution or 
ecological devastation in such terms? 
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price, but this may have differential impact on some sub-groups (e.g. such a policy is 
likely to be regressive).[12] So it might turn out that ‘restricting choice’ (e.g. 
restricting opening hours and places of sale, etc.) may be both more effective and 
more just (as it has a more equal impact). A balanced approach to policy making 
involves considering at the point of policy implementation all relevant factors, not 
crawling up the rungs of the ladder as policy failure follows policy failure.  
 
So if we count more than liberty as relevant, we cannot use the intervention ladder. 
The NCB’s dilemma is that they are forced to either reject the ladder or their 
pluralism. I have suggested some reasons why they should do the former. More 
generally, the intervention ladder is incoherent in its own terms, it is confusing as a 
metaphor and policy tool, and it fails to capture relevant normative considerations.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The intervention ladder is a problematic metaphor. It encourages ‘two-dimensional’ 
policy making, because it but is only focused on less or more liberty. This conflicts 
with the NCB’s stated pluralistic approach to relevant values. It is only the 
libertarian, someone who thinks that liberty is all that matters, who should purchase 
the intervention ladder from the policy DIY store. Any liberal, or any value pluralist, 
should look elsewhere for their favourite metaphors and policy tools. Public health 
seeks to provide the conditions for individual and collective flourishing. Part of such 
flourishing is, undoubtedly, having the freedom to make one’s own choices. But 
there is more than this to flourishing, and hence more to public health policy than 
merely maximising liberty. Public health seeks to provide ladders to promote health 
and to act to remove or reduce the potential harm from life’s snakes. We are not 
mere individual counters in a board game, locked into economic competition, one 
against all others. Ultimately, life is a collective endeavour, and public health policy 
and practice provides a key role in ensuring that as many people as possible get the 
most out of the game. 
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